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Abstract 
The article investigates why despite similar background conditions in Greece and Spain, the 
former country has been characterized by highly visible, fringe, anti-system politics and street 
riots, while similar phenomena are rare in Spain. Although the article’s focal point is the eruption 
of the December 2008 riots in Athens, it sheds light on the two countries’ diverse social reactions 
to the sovereign debt crisis. Deploying the tool of media framing, it argues that historical 
legacies and political cultures matter. In the Greek case, the transition to democracy shaped a 
political ‘culture of sympathy’ towards acts of resistance to the state, a culture that has been 
institutionalized since the mid-1970s.  
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Greek Riots 
On December 6, 2008, Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old schoolboy, was shot dead by a 
policeman in Exarchia, a bohemian district of Athens which hosts sizeable anarchist and 
libertarian communities. The news of the incident spread quickly among young people who used 
new technologies, such as blogs, websites and SMS, to call for a forceful reaction. The rioting 
that followed was of unprecedented magnitude. Schoolboys, students, migrants, anarchists and 
members of extra-parliamentary radical left groups were among the rioters. Riots lasted several 
days; hundreds of petrol bombs were thrown at the police, banks and state buildings, and there 
were numerous incidents of looting and violence. The rioters even looted the shop of the parents 
of the schoolboy shot by the police (Kathimerini 9/12/2008). The wrath of the rioters peaked 
when in a symbolic act they burned a Christmas tree in front of the Greek Parliament. A spill-
over of the protest occurred in Greek embassies in various EU capitals, staged predominantly by 
Greek students studying abroad. In brief, the Athenian riots signified a ‘turning point’ in the 
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return of ‘street politics’ to contemporary Greece (Economides and Monastiriotis 2009). This has 
been especially noticeable since the implementation of tough austerity measures that 
accompanied Greece’s economic bailout by the EU and the IMF in 2010. 
 
The Greek Puzzle 
The states in the Southern periphery of the Euro-area have been greatly affected by the sovereign 
debt crisis. Despite the EU bailout, Greece is on the brink of default, while the Spanish 
government has imposed severe austerity measures to manage its enormous sovereign debt. 
Despite similar background conditions, Greek and Spanish governments and societies have 
reacted quite differently. The vocal, yet non-violent, mobilization of the Spanish ‘May 15’ (M-
15) movement stands in sharp contrast to Greece’s repertoire of contention that includes rioting 
(El País 2011).  
Understanding what causes violent riots in a consolidated democracy like Greece may 
help us predict when street politics and other unconventional forms of protest are likely to take 
centre stage in other Western European societies. To this end, the paper juxtaposes two countries 
with comparable background conditions, Spain and Greece, focusing on the puzzling emergence 
of riots in Greece and the absence of violent collective action in Spain. In their recent history, 
both have experienced military control preceded by a divisive civil war. In both, the conclusion 
of an authoritarian period was followed by stellar transitions to democracy. They entered the 
European Union almost simultaneously, Greece in 1981 and Spain in 1986. More recently, they 
have struggled with enormous sovereign debt, deep recession and increasing unemployment. 
They are also considered transit points for immigrants seeking access to Western Europe and 
thus have sizeable immigrant communities. Furthermore, a strong tradition of left-wing 
grassroots movements is flourishing, evident in the long-term power of socialist parties.  
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Despite the similarities, in December 2008, Greece faced an intense and violent anti-
systemic movement with widespread rioting; this has not yet happened in Spain, despite  
skyrocketing (youth) unemployment. Why is Greece so different, given the similar economic, 
social and political conditions?  
The paper begins with a discussion of alternative explanations, including structural, 
institutional and electoral factors, as found in the literatures of street protest, riots and 
contentious politics, all of which fail to convincingly account for the Greek paradox. It then 
offers a two-level explanation. First, it shows how the type of the Greek transition to democracy 
shaped a political ‘culture of sympathy’ to acts of resistance against the state. Second, it notes the 
mechanisms through which daily practices of resistance have become institutionalized to 
permeate the Greek culture. It concludes that the cultivation of a political culture of sympathy 
has become a ‘winning formula’ adopted by vocal minorities who deploy unlawful protests. 
Equally, the early socialization into unlawful practices allows the public to turn a blind eye on 
the use of violence to settle conflict, unlike Spain where there is zero tolerance of violence.  
 
Alternative explanations 
A central problem in the literature of riots, reflecting a flaw in the broader study of political 
violence, is the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of political 
violence (Kalyvas et al 2008). Scholars from different disciplines approach the topic from 
different angles. Although seminal studies on riots have been published, they tend to be thematic, 
focusing, for example, on immigrant, religious, and ethnic riots (Dancygier 2009; Horowitz 
2003; Wilkinson 2004). The literature offers a plethora of theories as to why collective action 
takes unconventional and violent forms, ranging from irrational and psychological factors to 
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structural and demographic factors (LeBon 1897; Gurr 1970). However, for ease of discussion, 
the explanations can be roughly grouped into three categories (for a comprehensive review see 
Wilkinson 2009). 
 The first group of explanations focuses on the casual relationship between structural and 
material factors and violent action. Arguably, social inequality is behind rioting (Bethke and 
Bussman 2011). Relative deprivation theory posits that the feeling of grievance and injustice 
resulting from the gap between anticipated gains and actual gains is the most significant 
determinant of violent collective action (Gurr 1970).  Although relative deprivation is only one 
of many structuralist and materialist explanations, the core argument remains similar across this 
group’s critical spectrum: social inequality, absence of opportunities for social integration and 
economic scarcity cause riots.  
 
 
Basic Economic Indicators Greece Spain 
GDP per capita (2008) €17,505 €15,477 
Unemployment rate (2008) 7,7% 11,3% 
Minimum Wage (2008) €681 €700 
Inflation (Average annual 
percentage change 2006-08) 
3,3% 3,5% 
Growth (average annual 
percentage change of real 
GDP 2006-08) 
 
3,3% 
 
3,1% 
Table 1: Basic economic indicators in comparative perspective (Sources: IMF, EUROSTAT and 
OECD)  
 
This argument cuts across the t literature and is extremely popular among the public and 
in the media. Therefore, it calls for close scrutiny. To this end, Table 1 presents several crude 
economic indicators, including GDP per capita, level of unemployment and minimum wage in 
Greece and Spain in 2008. At first glance, the table adds little empirical evidence to the structural 
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argument, since basic economic indicators portray a comparable picture for the two countries. In 
fact, Greece had a slightly higher GDP per capita, lower unemployment and the two countries’ 
minimum wage was almost equal. Indeed, inflation and growth rates show that in the period 
preceding the riots, Greeks had slightly better purchasing power. Therefore, the eruption of 
violent collective action in Greece undermines materialist theories. More rigorous empirical 
evidence depicting the socio-economic background of the rioters is needed to test the validity of 
the argument. 
 The second set of explanations argues that although material issues may be important, 
violent collective action is triggered by a feeling of ‘injustice’ linked to an overall mistrust of 
institutions. Briefly stated, when state institutions are weak and the state fails to perform its 
fundamental duties effectively, the incentives for groups to deploy less conventional methods to 
affect policymaking greatly increase (Machado et al 2011). When state institutions do not settle 
disputes (Huntington 1968) and their control mechanisms break down, citizens take more direct 
forms of collective action (Olzak 1992; Useem 1998). To examine the plausibility of these 
arguments, Table 2 shows the perception of the quality of the rule of law, government 
effectiveness and voice and accountability in Spain and Greece in the period 2006-2008. The 
table draws on Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank which gives all countries a 
grade from extremely weak (-2.5) to strong (2.5).  A thread linking Spain and Greece is the low 
levels of perception of government effectiveness and the overall lack of trust in state institutions. 
Corruption is the only indicator where Greece, at almost 0, is markedly different from Spain 
(1.1). Traditionally, corruption is linked to the sense of justice in a country. Moreover, 
comparative empirical evidence derived from World Values Survey of 1999 shows that 58.7% of 
Spaniards had little or no confidence in the justice system; in Greece, the percentage was equally 
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high (56.3%) (World Values Survey 1999). In other words, dysfunctional institutions and 
ineffective governmental policies alone do explain the eruption of collective action in Greece but 
not in Spain.  
 
 
Institutional Indicators 
(2006-2008) 
Greece Spain 
Rule of Law 0,8 1,1 
Voice and Accountability  0.95 1,1 
Government Effectiveness  0,7 0,9 
Table 2: Institutional Indicators in Comparative Perspective (Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, World Bank) 
 
 
Wilkinson rightly argues that ‘group calculations to engage in collective action are also 
shaped by the state’s preventive or coercive action’, namely, whether they encounter strong 
opposition, weak opposition, or even support (2009:336). Previous research on ethnic riots has 
noted the pivotal role of the state in triggering or preventing collective action (Horowitz 2003). A 
similar argument is proffered by the literature of contentious politics, which highlights the 
importance of external ‘political opportunities’, most notably the role of the state, in triggering 
collective action (Tilly 1995, Tarrow 1994). What determines the willingness of governments to 
intervene in certain contexts but not in others may apply here. In a study of the Hindu-Muslim 
riots in India, Wilkinson (2004) highlights the electoral cost and benefit calculations of 
governments. In the Indian case, whether rioters represented critical constituents of a party in (a 
coalition) government was a significant determinant in the decision to abstain from repressing 
protesters (ibid). Yet electoral costs and benefits are shaped by public attitudes towards the 
implementation of law and order. As the Spanish and Greek experiences illustrate, political 
cleavages take shape during periods of violence, and over time, they become embedded. Positive 
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or negative perceptions of these violent legacies determine the electoral costs to a government. It 
is highly unlikely that government will suppress collective political action if it meets with 
widespread public sympathy.  
Considerations of cost also apply to the protesters and are shaped by previous experience; 
participants in collective actions often opt for familiar practices because this minimizes the 
likelihood of unexpected costs. This is particularly relevant in the Greek case where the 
perceived cost of rioting is low, not only because of police inefficiency but also because of the 
organizational experience of militant groups. In the aftermath of the riots in Rome in October 
2011, an anonymous rioter revealed in an interview that he got an ‘MSc in Rioting’ in the streets 
of Athens, indicating that the Greek context presents a valuable training opportunity (Vima 
2011).  
Further ethnographic research will show how practices of resistance against the state are 
perpetuated and reproduced. Although this paper acknowledges the importance of other 
contextual (economic, political, social) factors, it highlights the central role of culture in the 
adoption of specific repertoires of actions over others, (high/low) levels of public sympathy, and 
how societies set their threshold of ‘injustice’. To discern the causal mechanism that transforms 
culture into political outcomes, we draw on studies of the transition to democracy and political 
institutions.  
 
Culture of Sympathy 
The literature on democratization agrees that the political culture and the design of the nascent 
democratic institutions of a society in transition are shaped by past experiences (Linz and Stepan 
1996:5). In this case, the transition itself and the process of learning (Bermeo 1992) work 
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together to explain how the political cultures in Greece and Spain shape their respective 
collective action.  
 The Spanish civil war (1936-1939) was followed by the victory of the nationalist forces 
and the prolonged dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975). An established body of research 
has shown how the traumatic experiences of the civil war informed the priorities of the political 
leaders who carried out the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s (Aguilar 2002). The 
diagnosis that the primary cause of the civil war – and the ensuing 40-year dictatorship -- was the 
inability of the Second Republic (1931-1936) to maintain stability convinced political elites of 
the virtues of consensus. Therefore, Spain experienced a ‘paradigmatic’ transition founded on 
consensus among political leaders. It has been argued that the ‘pacted’ nature of the transition 
shaped the basic features of Spanish political culture, especially its propensity for consensus and 
ideological moderation (Martín 2005). These elements – believed to safeguard the success of the 
transition – became integral to Spanish political life, from nascent institutions, to electoral 
engineering (promoting coalition governments), to accommodating the ‘Nationalities’ (Field and 
Hamman 2008).  
 While Spain cultivated consensus, the Greek transition was considerably different. The 
Greek junta (1967-1974) collapsed after its forceful intervention into the domestic politics of the 
Republic of Cyprus, followed by a short-lived coup and the invasion of the Turkish army into the 
island. Hence, the transition represented a ‘clean break’, reflected in the design of the political 
institutions, the low proportionality of the electoral system, and the unilateral decisions of Prime 
Minister Karamanlis on issues of transitional justice (Sotiropoulos 2010).   
Every society institutionalizes and reproduces those practices perceived conducive to 
producing desirable outcomes. Thus, in Spain, consensus became institutionalized, while in 
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Greece , a culture of ‘resistance’ emerged. The Spanish political elites quickly realized that the 
deployment of a ‘vocal’ repertoire of protest by social, political, or professional groups would 
endanger overarching priorities during democratic consolidation. In fact, although mobilization 
was quite high during the early days of the transition, the murderous attacks against left-wing 
protesters in 1977 and the unsuccessful coup on February 23, 1981 (23-F) had a moderating 
effect on the demands of all groups. It should be noted that the terrorist activities of the Basque 
ETA also posed a considerable challenge to the stability of the regime.  
Meanwhile, in Greece, protesting, rioting, and resisting authority is part of a deep-rooted 
culture of resistance. The predominant narrative of the transition provides useful insights into the 
Greek political culture. For example, it reserves a special place for the student uprising of 
November 17, 1973, in the National Technical University of Athens – commonly called the 
‘Polytechnic’. Although accurate survey data are missing, it is not far-fetched to argue that the 
student uprising set in motion a series of events that led to the Cyprus debacle and the collapse of 
the dictatorship. In fact, in a 1997 public survey, the Polytechnic (although an academic 
institution and not a movement) and the ‘student movement’ (in general) were included in the list 
of resistance organizations (cited by Sotiropoulos 2010). In short, it has become the ‘Bastille Day 
of modern Greek democracy’ (Close 2009:137). 
The memory of the Polytechnic has made two overlapping contributions to the cultivation 
of a culture of resistance. First, the protesting youth acquired independent agency. Only the 
student movement overtly resisted the dictatorship. Second, the memory of the Polytechnic has 
institutionalized the individual’s ‘duty to resist the authority’ (Kalyvas 2008). Since the 1970s, 
November 17 has been a day of remembrance and a school holiday, and an annual memorial is 
conducted in the Polytechnic to pay tribute to the casualties, the number of whom remains 
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unknown. These cultural elements help explain why the public was so sensitive to the 2008 event 
that triggered rioting. The victim was a teenager, and the murder occurred in Exarheia, an 
Athenian suburb where anarchist, libertarian, and other anti-authority groups are located – a 
flammable mix.  
Thus, the political culture – influenced by the type of transition to democracy – explains 
the absence of violent collective action in Spain where ideological moderation and consensus 
have become central features of Spanish political culture. At the same time, in Greece, the 
transition has led to a culture of ‘resistance’. However, this culture refers to the origins 
(transition) and the vocabulary (political discourse of the 1970s). What explains the persistence 
and reproduction of these practices? 
 
Framing by the media  
Spilerman (1970) shows the importance of media in spreading rumors about violent incidents, 
thereby inciting ‘riot contagion’. Media analysis can shed light on how the December 2008 riots 
in Athens were transmitted. To this end, the paper draws upon the analytical tool of media 
framing. To frame an event is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations’ (Entman 1993:52). 
Framing is not a reflection of reality, but a simplification of a ‘perceived reality’ (Loizides 
2009). In essence, it represents a deliberate effort by specific social actors to produce, guide, and 
maintain meaning for their constituents (Benford and Snow 2000:613; Kovras and Loizides 
2011). Policy-makers, media, and even ordinary people deploy simplified mental images to 
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interpret complex social and political events and choose among alternative courses of action 
(Tetlock 1998:876).   
 Framing is composed of two analytical elements. Diagnostic framing stems from the 
need to identify the cause(s) of the problematic situation and to apportion responsibility/blame. 
In essence, the present situation is perceived to be unjust and grievances are attributed to the 
actions/omissions of another agent, or more generally, conditions outside the control of the ‘in-
group’ (Gamson 1992). Prognostic framing derives from the need to change the problematic 
situation by designing a strategy to overcome it (Benford and Snow 2000).  
 Two widely distributed Greek daily newspapers are Eleftherotipia and Kathimerini. 
Eleftherotipia is a prestigious newspaper at the left of the center of the ideological spectrum; its 
readership ranges in age and ideology from students to policy-makers. It covers the activities of 
new social movements, such as the anti-globalization movement and the global anti-war 
campaign. For its part, Kathimerini is a well-respected conservative newspaper. Even so, 
Kathimerini is read by many centrist readers, and it publishes articles with divergent ideological 
points of view.  
We searched all articles describing or commenting on the Greek riots, commencing the 
day after the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos (December 6, 2008), believed to be the event 
triggering the riots, and ending the next month (January 2009) when the violence ceased.  
 Two broad, but overlapping, diagnostic frames emerge from Eleftherotipia. First, because 
the murder of the schoolboy and the riots were causally and temporally linked (the violence 
erupted an hour after the teen died), the primary responsibility for the riots is attributed to police 
violence. The incident is not presented as the act of an individual; rather, the police are held 
accountable as a repressive institution, and this diagnosis is linked to past historical experiences. 
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For example, in the first days of rioting, several articles draw parallels with similar incidents of 
police brutality in the past, some of which resulted in the death of civilians (Marnellos 8/12/08 
and Antoniadis 13/12/08).  The riots are also viewed through the lens of past experiences of the 
civil war and the military dictatorship. An observer argues, ‘We do not want this state, the deep 
state, the offspring of Junta….that was never purified’ (Aggelopoulos 09/12/08). People 
confronting complex social-political phenomena often look to the past to draw parallels and 
make sense of these phenomena. Thus, the newspaper characterizes the riots of 2008 as the 
‘December of the youth’ – a direct reference to the events of December 1944 in Athens which 
paved the way for civil war (20/12/08).  
 In the newspaper, frequent references to the high levels of unemployment, low salaries 
and poor employment conditions – also known as G700
1
 -- help to explain the widespread 
sympathy for the mobilization of the youth, even when it turned violent (11/12/2008). Given the 
social conditions which evidently caused the mobilization, it is not surprising that the riots are 
linked to acts of resistance during the anti-dictatorial struggle. A former minister who 
participated in the 1973 Polytechnic uprising is quoted as saying the riots share several 
similarities with the anti-dictatorial mobilization (Efthymiou 28/12/2008). 
 Eleftherotipia’s diagnostic framing also refers to the systemic roots of the riots and the 
structural problems created by capitalism and globalization. An observer insists that Greek riots 
are a symptom of a deeper systemic crisis of the ‘values that uphold these institutions, namely 
the individualistic values of competition and egotism’ (Fotopoulos 20/12/2008). Because the 
heart of the problem is political (globalization, capitalism, ineffective state, etc.), the newspaper 
adopts the term ‘uprising’ (εξέγερση) -- instead of riots. Almost one-third of the articles we 
                                                             
1
  Generation 700 Euros 
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examined contain a subtle reference to the political causes of the ‘revolt’.   Moreover, because of 
the common structural source of the situation, the paper estimates that the uprising will spill over 
to other European societies with similar challenges: ‘The Greek uprising is considered a 
precursor. Europe lives in fear of a widespread uprising’ (Papanastasoulis 17/12/2008). It argues: 
‘Alexandros Grigoropoulos should be rightly considered the first victim in our country for the 
survival of the planet as well as the potential of the youth’ (Pantelakis 9/12/2008).  
 Kathimerini’s framing of the source of the problematic situation both agrees with and 
diverges from Eleftherotipia. It subscribes to the linkage between the shooting that triggered the 
riots and the wider political problems (dysfunctional political institutions, corrupt political 
system and grievances of the youth) but abstains from referring to the phenomenon as an 
‘uprising’. Instead, it says: ‘The unfortunate death of their age-mate, armed the hand of the 15-
year old with the stone-aka-vote of the wrath for a society that does not give them [the youth] a 
passport to study, to employment or a better life’ (Bistika 11/12/2008). The paper also cites high 
rates of unemployment, low income, and miserable prospects in its explanations of the protests.  
 Still, there are differences in the two frames. While both identify the police as the source 
of the problem, Kathimerini focuses on the structural weaknesses of this body in maintaining law 
and order, both in the murder itself and in the ineffective reaction to the ensuing violence. 
Several articles note the decades-long structural deficiencies of the police, as well as its non-
professional behavior, with special emphasis on examples of police brutality in the preceding 
months (Antoniou 9/12/2008; Magklinis 17/12/2008; Zoulas 9/12/2008).  
 The conservative Kathimerini subscribes to the general diagnostic framing used by 
Eleftherotipia to identify the role of politics. However, its political sources are primarily 
domestic, whereas Eleftherotipia directly links the ‘Greek uprising’ to wider phenomena of 
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globalization and capitalism. Remarkably, both newspapers abstain from prognostic framing. 
Apart from the subtle qualified tolerance of the protests, and obvious consensus on the need to 
reform the police, there is little mention of what should be done. Because of the complexity, 
intensity, and duration of the riots, commentators seem reluctant to make recommendations. 
 In similar vein, in the television coverage of the December riots, journalists portrayed the 
three days as an ‘uprising’, subtly legitimizing social discontent. At times they almost 
encouraged young people to join the rioting. Although the majority of student mobilization was 
comprised of peaceful marches against police brutality, the focus of prime-time news was on sit-
in mobilizations in front of police stations that were marked by insults, objects being thrown at 
guards, and attempts to occupy the police stations. These acts of resistance were presented as 
normal yet heroic reactions to police brutality. In several documentaries broadcast in the days 
following the riots, the violence was ‘explained’ as a reply to the ‘violence of school’, the 
‘violence of scandals,’ and the ‘violence of police in the streets’ (Tsimas).  
Greek media framing helps us understand how a culture of sympathy to resistance has 
been perpetuated. By and large, the Greek media are composed of journalists who came of age 
during the transition and who tend to reproduce the ‘vocabulary’ of transition. Even the most 
moderate media outlets subtly supported a framing that posits the riots as a normal reaction to the 
economic, social, political, and policing problems of the country. In short, the media’s role has 
been to familiarize the public with the use of violence as an acceptable way to settle public 
disputes.  
 
‘Ritualization of resistance’ in schools 
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This culture of sympathy is reproduced and perpetuated through the ritualization of acts of 
resistance in public schools. Greek students become socialized into (often unlawful) acts of 
resistance with the support of their teachers and parents, making participation in riots seem a rite 
of passage (Kalyvas 2008). A good example is the phenomenon of ‘school occupation’ as a form 
of protest. Since the consolidation of democracy, small groups of students have illegally 
occupied school buildings, stopping classes and preventing the entry of teachers. Students 
occupying the schools make a number of demands, ranging from changes in the school 
infrastructure to education reform; not coincidentally, waves of occupations coincide with 
periods of broader educational reform.  
What is particularly striking is the support of parent associations and teacher unions. In 
early 2008, a few months before the riots, a wave of school occupations was underway; several 
district attorneys demanded the implementation of the law
2
 prohibiting unlawful acts, including 
damage to buildings and infrastructures. The most vocal teachers’ union, the Greek Federation of 
State School Teachers of Secondary Education (OLME) urged the government to abstain from 
implementing the law, framing school occupations as a means of ‘social struggle’ that should not 
be persecuted or penalized (OLME 2010). The Federation officially asked the attorney to abstain 
from taking any legal action against students arrested in occupied school buildings (2008). For 
its part, the Federation of Parents Association perceived the decision to prosecute as an effort to 
‘persecute’ a noble struggle and ‘terrorize parents, student community and the teachers’ (2008). 
The Association refers to other – unaffiliated – parents who cooperate with the authorities as 
‘finks’ (ibid).  
Thus, students receive an early education in resistance practices. Consider the reaction to 
the proposal to implement CCTV cameras is schools in the aftermath of the 2004 Athens 
                                                             
2
 Law 2811/2000 
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Olympics. School chancellors were forced by student and parent associations to ‘rip’ the cameras 
down, as they were perceived to be a sign of growing state surveillance (Samatas 2008:359). It is 
hardly surprising, then, that during the December 2008 events, the Greek Teachers’ Federation 
(DOE) encouraged resistance ‘against the governmental policy of repression’ (2008). This led to 
mass demonstrations in front of police stations with students throwing stones and oranges at 
police officers. As Kalyvas argues (2008), after intense socialization into acts of resistance and 
unlawful protest, riots are a continuation of a ‘duty to resist the authorities’, becoming a rite of 
passage for youth.  
 
Resistance: ‘A Winning Formula’ 
The practice of resistance is not limited to schools but has become a winning political formula 
for all sorts of interest groups formulating claims against the state. For the past three decades, all 
sorts of interest and civil society groups, ranging from trade unions and teachers’ unions to 
football fans have successfully deployed unlawful repertoires of protest to formulate claims 
against the state. Public buildings and ministries have been occupied by professional 
associations; national motorways have been blocked by farmers and lorry drivers; coordinated 
action was taken by dockworkers to prohibit ships with thousands of passengers to disembark; 
taxi drivers have blocked airports and ports nationwide; garbage collectors have occupied 
garbage dumps for weeks triggering a major sanitation crisis. This picture of a society composed 
of ‘spoiler groups’ using unlawful practices to secure their demands/privileges should not be 
linked exclusively to the economic recession, since these practices were deployed before the 
sovereign debt crisis, albeit less frequently.  
17 
 
Fundamental tenets were set in the early days of Metapolitefsi and the emergence of 
‘populism’ as a central ingredient in Greek politics in the early 1980s (Mavrogordatos 1983). At 
this time, the PASOK socialist government successfully used ideology to justify ‘machine 
politics’ (Mavrogordatos 1997). Framed within a wider call for ‘change’, meritocracy was 
perceived as an undemocratic ‘authoritarian fraud’ that blurred the distinction between the 
‘privileged’ and the ‘non-privileged’ (Mavrogordatos 1997:18). Most Greek political parties 
have employed populism because the ‘potential immediate beneficiaries are by definition’ more 
than those who benefit from meritocracy (ibid:22). The ‘logic of populism’ has become a well-
entrenched feature of the Greek political system; no party can resist its attractiveness, while civil 
society and labor unions have secured its perpetuation (Sotiropoulos 1995). Greek politicians 
have borrowed liberally and used EEC/EU funds to perpetuate the system, contributing to the 
bleak economic predicament of the late 2000s.  
 Although party penetration (and control) by civil society groups constitutes a common 
feature of Spanish politics as well, similar forms of collective action have been absent (Gunther 
and Montero 2009:177). The explanation for the deployment of the specific repertoire of 
contention in Greece can be attributed to the political elites who have been willing to pay the 
economic cost of accommodating a clientelistic system. This practice has been exercised with 
such success that has become a ‘winning political formula’. Illegal actions, disobedience, public 
disturbance and even violence to protect group interests are seen as a normal extension of the 
right to protest (Kalyvas 2010a). There are even cases of ‘state sponsored’ acts of resistance. 
Take, for example, the decision of the president of a regional chamber of commerce in northern 
Greece to charge the state for printing placards and brochures for a group mobilized around the 
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demand for free transit on national motorways; this group has often occupied toll booths and 
broken the bars to facilitate free transit (Mandravelis 2011).  
 A stark illustration of how this winning formula has taken on a life of its own is the 
recent mobilization of the inhabitants of Keratea, a small city near Athens. The citizens 
proactively resisted the state’s effort to construct a garbage dump. Perceiving the dump as 
degrading the environment and affecting the quality of living, protestors set fire to construction 
vehicles and erected massive road blocks on the highway. The state replied by sending police to 
guard the construction crews. Anarchist and anti-authority groups joined the protesters, using 
petrol bombs against the police and constructing a trench across both lanes of the highway 
(Bacatoros 2011). The struggle of the people of Keratea attracted significant media attention and 
garnered much public sympathy. A number of artistic events were organized; for example, Greek 
singers participated in a concert paying tribute to the struggle (Eleftherotipia 31/3/2010). For 
almost three months, Keratea was in a state of mini-riot. In the end, police withdrew and the 
construction of the dump was cancelled, showing that resistance is an effective way to express 
collective demands. At least in Greece, resistance, in general, and rioting, in particular, are ‘low 
cost’ activities. 
 
Institutionalization of practice of resistance 
A final mechanism explaining the persistence and perpetuation of resistance practices, including 
riots, is their de jure and de facto institutionalization. The law on university and academic 
freedom constitutes the most obvious example of de jure institutionalization. The memories of 
the 1973 Polytechnic events have acquired strong symbolic/emotional salience because they are 
widely considered to have destabilized the authoritarian regime. And the students’ mobilization 
19 
 
was possible because the Greek universities are protected by asylum law; in other words, 
universities are safe havens where police intervention is prohibited. Hence, the ‘legitimizing 
moment’ for democracy is directly linked to this institution.  
The heroic view of the Polytechnic, coupled with the previous experience of violations of 
fundamental rights and liberties during the dictatorship has resulted in the (re)establishment of a 
very liberal institution with provisions safeguarding individual and collective rights: university 
asylum. In the early period following the transition, efforts to de facto abolish university asylum 
were fiercely resisted by militant student groups (Psacharopoulos and Kazamias 1980:130). 
Ultimately, in 1982 the new socialist government of PASOK, perceived to be the inheritor of the 
anti-dictatorship tradition, further institutionalized university asylum by legislating it into law 
n.1268 (art.2).  
 In the post-authoritarian period, the institutionalization of the academic asylum law 
facilitated the reproduction and perpetuation of rioting as a means of expression. Although the 
Greek constitution, following EU trends, explicitly refers to ‘academic expression’, a very 
expansive interpretation has been adopted which extends academic expression to include the 
freedom of action within university areas (Panousis 2009).The safe haven offered by the 
university buildings explains the eruption of riots close to university buildings. It also explains 
the obvious pattern whereby violent protests follow calls for education reform. Participants take 
refuge in university buildings in Athens and Salonika which are located within walking distance 
of riot hot–spots. This creates a steady and predictable link between violent protests and 
protesters who hide in university buildings.  
 Greece is not the only country in Southern Europe with a vibrant student movement that 
resists authoritarianism. In fact, in the late 1950s a vocal student movement spread in Spanish 
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universities -- especially in Madrid -- composed of the children of both the defeated and the 
winners of the civil war (Morales 1980). Although academic freedom and institutional autonomy 
in Spain are constitutionally secured (Art.27(10)), there is no institution similar to the Greek 
asylum law (Karran 2007). The difference in approach should be attributed to the individual 
discursive legacies of transition; while in Spain, most parties, including the socialist PSOE, were 
committed to a ‘pact of silence’ about the past (Aguilar 2002), in Greece the majority of political 
parties (especially the Left) sought to capitalize on the past, leading to the institutionalization of 
‘acts of resistance’.  
This should be coupled with the fact that violent collective action is a low-cost activity, 
since few are arrested and even fewer are tried (Kalyvas 2010b). For example, according to the 
Greek police, between December 2008 and January 2008, there were 420 demonstrations/ 
protests and 602 incidents when public or private property was damaged, but there were only 188 
arrests. Even most striking is the violent reaction to the economic bailout package in early May 
2010. A few hooded protestors threw petrol bombs into a bank which was open despite the 
general strike, causing the death of three clerks; to this day, no one has been held accountable. 
This points to the (failed) central role of the Greek police to handle violent protests by arresting 
those responsible. 
As noted, the Greek public perceives the police negatively. According to the 1999 World 
Values Survey, only 28.1% of Greeks trust the police. Meanwhile, the Spaniards who had an 
equally repressive Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) during the Francoist years have remarkable 
confidence in the police (54.9%). These findings pose a puzzle to the transitional justice 
literature, especially as the transition in Greece offered better prospects for reforming the police.  
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The objective of Spanish politicians to reform and democratize the police was a 
herculean task; it was not vetted by Francoist elements, and the pacted nature of the transition 
mentioned above meant that any successful reforms depended on the proactive consensus of 
members of the ancient regime. In sharp contrast to Greece, the socialist PSOE ‘took care not to 
make the entire police force responsible for mischief. Instead it chose to voice its support of the 
police mobilizing the themes of “Law-and-Order’ frame”’ (Cerezales 2010:438). The path was 
not easy, and it should be highlighted that the brutality of the Spanish police in the early 
democratic period far surpassed Greece’s experience. From 1970 to 1995, 94 persons were killed 
by the police during demonstrations or protests (Cerezales 2010:441). Furthermore, in the 1980s, 
a secret anti-terrorist group (GAL – Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) was organized by the 
police, in close coordination with several PSOE members, to tackle Basque terrorism. During its 
campaign, GAL killed, extra-judicially executed and tortured several individuals, some of whom 
were innocent (Encarnación2007). If police brutality was the causal factor for violent collective 
action, one would expect more riots in Spain.  
Greek political elites representing parties that suffered severe persecution during 
authoritarianism only hesitantly accepted the Greek police as part of the state apparatus, clearly 
doubting their loyalty to the new democratic game. As a result, the police were put under close 
political scrutiny. This is evident from the orientation of the police reforms: the unification of the 
two police bodies (Gendarmerie and Urban Police) in 1984 and the dependence of the Chief of 
Police on the designated Minister (Zianikas 1995). Both developments diminished the autonomy 
of the police and, consequently, its effectiveness. The Minister of Public Order gives the general 
orders and provides guidelines for the riot police. Politicians prefer to adopt a defensive position 
even if this means minimal arrests. This lack of trust in the police (as an institution) is reflected 
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in the persistent denial of the right of the police to establish unions until the mid-1990s, making 
Greece the only country in the EU where this democratic right was prohibited (Stergioulis 
2001:231). It is not an overstatement to argue that the political elites’ stranglehold led to the 
growing organizational incompetence of the Greek police.  
In this context, rioting is seen as a low risk activity, firstly, because of the low number of 
arrests, but secondly and more significantly, because of the public sympathy towards protesters 
and open hostility towards the police, attitudes frequently shared by the politicians who lead the 
police. An illustrative example appears in the parliamentary debates on the day after the 
December 2008 riots when an MP of the socialist opposition ‘ordered’ the ‘police forces to 
abstain from using the parliament’s backyard to exercise acts of brutal behavior (against 
protesters) on the part of police similar to those we watched previously on TV. Today there is a 
public mobilization – justified mobilization – reaction to the brutality that police showed over the 
last few days’ (8/12/2008:2947). Interestingly, this politician became the Minister mandated to 
lead the police. 
 
Conclusion 
Most theories of violent collective action focus on the nexus between motivation and cost. 
Although people tend to pursue actions that maximize gains and minimize costs before they act 
violently, the literature downplays the fact that the concepts of cost/gain are often mediated 
through culture. In effect, individuals opt for practices with which they are familiar; a formula 
that was ‘winning’ in the past is thought to secure positive outcomes in the future. The paper 
shows how a Greek ‘culture of sympathy’ towards acts of resistance to the state has been 
institutionalized and reproduced.  
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Surprisingly, the concept of ‘public sympathy’ has received scant attention, even though 
it affects political outcomes by facilitating or preventing state intervention. Consider the 
difference between the UK and Greece. In the aftermath of the 2011 London riots, David 
Cameron stressed, ‘If you are old enough to commit these crimes, you are old enough to face the 
punishment’ (Guardian 2011). In Greece, meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior, said, ‘We 
prefer a police in defence that protects human rights, even when scoffed, than any aggressive 
stance that could harm any individual or, even worse, lead to the loss of another life’.  
South European societies have often been treated as identical cases in the face of the 
sovereign debt crisis. Yet a comparative study of Greece and Spain shows that despite their 
similar background conditions, the two societies deal with these issues in quite different ways. 
With deep economic recession and severe austerity measures, will protests wax or wane in 
Greece? It is not overstating the matter to say that Greece is experiencing a traumatic and 
uncertain ‘second’ transition. In times of crises (or disasters), societies usually look to the past to 
explain the (institutional, political and social) failure to prevent disaster. This process of political 
learning depends on the ability of political elites to adapt to new conditions (Bermeo 1992). 
Arguably, because of the need to reach the twin objectives of debt reduction and broader state 
reforms, the ability of Greek politicians to distribute resources to accommodate an elite system 
will shrink. Vocal minority groups will gradually cease to perceive unlawful collective action as 
a winning political formula, because public sympathy towards, and tolerance of, acts of 
resistance will plummet. Ethnographic evidence of ‘critical constituents’, such as shopkeepers in 
central Athens, could substantiate this argument. Finally, but equally importantly, the fact that 
politicians have been the target of violent attacks is also expected to strengthen the credibility of 
the law and order frame.  
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